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Abstract
Abduction is an inference mechanism where given a knowledge base and some observations, the
reasoner tries to find hypotheses which together with the knowledge base explain the observations.
A reasoning based on such an inference mechanism is referred to as abductive reasoning. Given
a theory and some observations, by filtering the theory with the observations, we mean selecting
only those models of the theory that entail the observations. Entailment with respect to these
selected models is referred to as filter entailment. In this paper we give necessary and sufficient
conditions when abductive reasoning with respect to a theory and some observations is equivalent to
the corresponding filter entailment. We then give sufficiency conditions for particular knowledge
representation formalisms that guarantee that abductive reasoning can indeed be done through
filtering and present examples from the knowledge representation literature where abductive
reasoning is done through filtering. We extend the notions of abductive reasoning and filter entailment
to allow preferences among explanations and models respectively and give conditions when they are
equivalent. Finally, we give a weaker notion of abduction and abductive reasoning and show the later
to be equivalent to filter entailment under less restrictive conditions. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
Keywords: Filtering; Abductive reasoning; Filter preferential entailment; Knowledge assimilation; Weak
abduction
1. Introduction and motivation
Abduction is an inference mechanism where given a knowledge base and some
observations, the reasoner tries to find hypotheses which together with the knowledge
base explain the observations. These hypotheses are then referred to as explanations of the
observations with respect to the knowledge base. Abduction was introduced by Peirce [49,
50] in the beginning of the century and has been used in various AI applications [52,
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55], including: temporal explanations [13,62,63]; diagnosis [56,58]; planning [1,22,45];
natural language understanding [30]; default reasoning [24,32,51,53], belief revision and
updates [6,7]; and formulation of negation as failure [24,32].
Although, abduction is often used as a ‘backward reasoning’ method where observations
are explained, we can also do ‘forward reasoning’ using abduction. This happens when
certain new conclusions are entailed by each of the explanations 2 (or each of the preferred
explanations) of an observation together with the knowledge base. By new conclusions we
mean conclusions that are not entailed by the knowledge base without using abduction.
Moreover, these conclusions may not be entailed by the theory obtained by simply adding
the observations to the knowledge base. The following example makes this point clear.
Example 1. Consider the knowledge base T represented by the following logic program:
fly(X)← bird(X),
fly(X)← aeroplane(X),
haswings(X)← aeroplane(X),
haswings(X)← bird(X).
Now, suppose we observe {fly(tweety)}. If we would like to explain this observation in
terms of the predicates bird and aeroplane, then this observation has three explanations:
E1 = {bird(tweety)},
E2 = {aeroplane(tweety)},
E3 = {bird(tweety),aeroplane(tweety)}.
It is easy to see that for i = 1,2,3, T ∪ Ei entails the new conclusion haswings(tweety),
which is not entailed by T . However, the theory T ∪ {fly(tweety)}, obtained by simply
adding the observation to the theory, does not entail haswings(tweety).
We refer to the entailment of haswings(tweety) from the theory T and the observation
{fly(tweety)} as abductive entailment and reasoning with respect to this entailment
relation as abductive reasoning. Such entailments were used in [12,19] while formalizing
reasoning about actions using abductive logic programming and one such entailment was
formally defined—using generalized stable models [23,33]—with respect to abductive
logic programming in [2]. Shanahan in Chapter 17 of his book [64] refers to such
entailments as ‘knowledge assimilation’.
Several researchers [37,59,64] have used a different approach to assimilate observations.
In this approach observations are assimilated into a theory by selecting only those
models of the theory that entail the observations. Note that since the theory could be
in a nonmonotonic language, this is not same as adding the observations to the theory.
Sandewall, the first (to the best of our knowledge) to have used this in a non-probabilistic
2 Pearl [47,48] refers to such reasoning from evidence to explanation, and then from explanation to predictions
as transduction.
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setting [59] refers to this as filtering. (In a probabilistic setting the notion of Bayesian
conditioning is very similar [25].)
The goal of this paper is to study the relationship between these two approaches to
assimilate observations. But since the filtering approach is comparatively new and less
well-known in non-probabilistic settings, although quite pervasive in the recent research
on reasoning about actions, we first give a brief overview of its use.
1.1. Use of filtering in knowledge representation: A brief overview
Three research groups that have extensively used filtering or an equivalent notion in their
recent research are:
– Sandewall and his group at Linkoping University.
– Shanahan and his colleagues at Imperial College.
– The Texas action group at the University of Texas at Austin and the University of
Texas at El Paso.
1.1.1. Use of filtering at Linkoping University
Filtering was first introduced by Sandewall in [59], his IJCAI-89 paper titled ‘Filter
Preferential Entailment for the Logic of Action in Almost Continuous Worlds’. In that
paper he defines a binary function Filter whose inputs are a non-empty set of formulas
representing observations (Γ0), and a set of models (S), and defines Filter(Γ0, S) as a
subset of S consisting of those members of S which are also models of Γ0.
The goal of that paper in Sandewall’s own words are:
“The topic of the present paper is now rephrased formally as follows:
Let Γ0 be a set of formulas representing observations (or goals, in a planning
problem); let Γ be a set of formulas representing all the other given information;
we look for a formula φ which characterizes the set of actions, or plan, that accounts
for or obtains the observations. Often φ would be a disjunction of expressions each
of which characterizes an alternative explanation or plan.”
He lists two possible model set criteria for the simple case where there are observations
but no actions.
– M1 =Min(,Mod(Γ ∪ Γ0)).
– M2 = Filter(Γ0,Min(,Mod(Γ ))).
While comparing them, he first says:
“The definition of M2 however has an intuitive appeal:
since Min(,Mod(Γ )) is the set of all possible developments in the world regardless
of any observations, it would make sense to take the whole set and ‘filter’ it with the
given observations.”
He then has a discussion and an example and concludes:
“Based on this discussion and example, we suggest that the definition of M2 is the
one which should be used for identifying model sets in piecewise continuous worlds,
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and as the first step in the definition of semantic entailment there. The term filter
preferential entailment is proposed for semantic entailment using the definition of
M2 as its model set criterium.”
He then considers the case where action occurrences are present, and uses an additional
preference condition and proposes the following model set criterium:
Min(≺,Filter(Γ0,Min(,Mod(Γ )))),
where  only compares interpretations with the same action set, and ≺ compares
interpretations according to the preference of their respective action sets.
The notion of filtering and filter preferential entailment has played a crucial role in
subsequent works over the next decade by Sandewall and his colleagues and students at
Linkoping University. In particular:
– In his book [60] he has a subsection (9.4) titled ‘Entailment methods that use filtering
and their assessments’.
– In his recent survey article [61] he has a subsection (4.1) on preferential entailment
methods where he discusses the use of filter preferential entailment in correctly
dealing with postdiction scenarios, where there are also observations about non-initial
time points. He also mentions that Lifschitz in [37] has formulated filtering as nested
circumscription and shown its use for nonmonotonic applications in several areas,
including several approaches to the frame problem.
– In the recent survey article [18] Doherty et al. (also members of Sandewall’s group at
Linkoping University) discuss their language TAL, which is based on PMON [15]—a
logic from [59], which is defined using filtering. Thus, while filtering is used only in
some of the entailment relations defined in [60], it is part of the formulation of TAL
and is directly or indirectly used in a large body of work (for example, [16,17,29])
done in the context of TAL.
1.1.2. Forced separation
Shanahan in his book [64] uses separation theorems, one of which gives conditions when
CIRC(Σ∧∆;ρ∗;σ∗) is equivalent to CIRC(Σ;ρ∗;σ∗)∧∆, whereΣ and∆ are formulas
and ρ∗ and σ∗ are tuples of predicate symbols, and CIRC refers to circumscription.
In Chapter 16 of his book, he discusses the use of CIRC(Σ;ρ∗;σ∗) ∧ ∆ and similar
formulations [10,35,40] where only part of the theories are circumscribed (as opposed to
a circumscription of the theory as a whole) in solving the frame problem where there is
no separation theorem backing its use. He refers to this as forced separation. His notion
of forced separation can be viewed as a special case of filtering where the models of
CIRC(Σ;ρ∗;σ∗) are filtered by ∆. In that chapter Shanahan gives several objections
against using forced separation, but nevertheless mentions many instances where forced
separation has been used and how it can be used to produce elegant solutions to the frame
problem. In his own words (Section 16.3, p. 308):
“ Those who are unimpressed by these objections to forced separation can exploit the
idea to produce other elegant solutions to the frame problem. This section presents a
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version of the circumscriptive event calculus in which the forced separation approach
is deployed. The result is a much simpler formulation than that of Chapters Fourteen
and Fifteen, and is closer in some respects to the logic programming formulation in
Chapter Thirteen.”
1.1.3. The Texas action group at Austin and El Paso
The idea of filtering has also been extensively used by the Texas action group [35,37,43,
44,65,67], and results in one of the three basic principles in the formulation by McCain and
Turner in [44,67]. The various papers by the Texas action group where the idea of filtering
is used are:
– The notion of nested circumscription developed by Lifschitz in [37] is a generalization
of the notion of filtering where multiple levels of filtering can be expressed. Nested
circumscription is used in his works in [35] and also by others in [4,5] for formalizing
reasoning about actions.
– Lifschitz in [38] points out that writing observations as constraints—as opposed to
facts that are directly added to the theory—is one of the three principles followed
by McCain and Turner in their formulation [44,67] using Reiter’s default logic [57].
Basically, the constraints are used to filter the theory. In case of default logic,
they represent constraints by default rules with empty consequents (or false as the
consequent) and in case of logic programs constraints are represented using rules
with empty head (or false in the head).
Baral and Gelfond also represent observations as constraints in their logic programming
formulation in [3] and Baral, Gabaldon and Provetti in [4,5] use nested circumscription to
formulate narratives.
1.2. Relating filtering and abductive reasoning: Motivations
Besides the fact that both filtering and abductive reasoning are used for assimilating
observations, our motivations to study the relationship between the two are as follows:
(i) Many of the papers that use filtering (that are mentioned in the previous section)
use formal terms, such as ‘explanation’, from abductive reasoning, without giving
any formal results linking their formulation using filtering to abductive reasoning.
Our impression after reading these papers were that they were doing some form
of abductive reasoning; but we could not find any formal result linking abductive
reasoning to filtering. This motivated us to look for a formal connection.
(ii) We would like to know when abductive reasoning with respect to a theory and a set
of observations is equivalent to using filtering of the models of the theory by the
observations. Knowing these conditions is useful in many ways:
– Using these conditions, we would be able to know if indeed the use of filtering
in the papers mentioned in the previous section results in abductive reasoning.
– Filtering seems to have more efficient implementations. We are aware of two
systems [21,46] that are extremely fast at generating (stable) models of logic
programs with constraints, and often use the constraints in the generation
process itself to eliminate a large number of models, that would have violated
constraints. These systems can be (and have been) used for filtering with respect
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to logic programs. In particular, the smodels system [46] has been used to do
planning [14] in times that were competitive to the best planners available.
Although, we are aware of a few abductive systems [11,34], there has not been a
systematic comparison of their performance with respect to other systems.
– Thus knowing when abductive reasoning can be done using filtering, we can
formulate our theory appropriately so that we can do abductive reasoning and
the corresponding knowledge assimilation using filtering. This provides us with
an alternative way to do abductive reasoning.
(iii) When the conditions are satisfied and filtering is equivalent to abductive reasoning,
we have additional justification for using filtering. Recall that we mentioned in the
previous subsection about Shanahan’s objections to forced separation, his term for
filtering. We hope that equivalence to abductive reasoning will overcome some of
his objections.
(iv) We can also study what kind of reasoning happens with filtering when the
conditions are not satisfied. Does filtering under those circumstances still makes
sense?
1.3. Organization of the rest of the paper: A summary of contributions
In Section 2 we formally define simple abductive entailment and filtering. In Section 3
we give generic conditions on theories that guarantee the equivalence of abductive
reasoning and filter entailment. In Section 4 we develop specific sufficiency conditions that
satisfy the generic conditions for the equivalence when the theories are first-order theories,
circumscriptive theories, disjunctive logic programs, and default theories. We show that
the transformed theory obtained by Console et al. in [9] satisfies our conditions, and hence
filtering with respect to it (by just adding the observations, as it is a monotonic theory) is
equivalent to abductive reasoning.
In Section 5 we show that the generic conditions of Section 3 are also necessary for
the equivalence of abductive reasoning and filter entailment. In Section 6 we consider
abductive entailment and filtering in presence of preference criteria and expand on the
generic conditions to guarantee equivalence in this case. In Section 7 we define a weaker
notion of abductive reasoning and show its equivalence with filtering under less restrictive
conditions. In Section 8 we conclude and briefly discuss future directions; in particular,
the consequences of removing some of the restrictions made in the paper while defining
abductive reasoning.
2. Basic definitions: Simple abduction and filtering
The main notion in abductive reasoning is the notion of explanations. Given a theory
T in a language with an entailment relation ‘’ and an observation Obs, an explanation is
normally (for example, in Section 17.6 of [64] and in Section 1 of [9]) defined as a formula
∆, such that T ∪∆ is consistent (i.e., it has a model) and T ∪∆  Obs. In addition, most
often—including the above mentioned papers—there is a restriction placed on ∆ that it
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be made of abducible predicates. Thereafter in many works, preference relations between
explanation formulas are defined and used to define preferred or minimal explanations.
Instead of using abducible predicates (as in [9,32,64]), we make a slight generalization
and use ground abducible literals, but make a restriction 3 that if an atom is abducible so is
its negation. This set of ground abducible literals, which we will also refer to as abducibles,
is denoted by Abd, and the atoms in this set are referred to by Abda .
In our formulation instead of defining explanations as formulas, we define them as
(complete) interpretations of the abducibles. Since our ultimate goal is to define abductive
entailment, not just to define explanations, this is not a limitation when the theory
is in classical logic, possibly augmented with circumscription. Moreover, by having
explanations as interpretations of the abducibles, it is easier to define sophisticated model
theoretic preference ordering between explanations. This requirement of explanations
being a complete subset of abducibles, could be a limitation when the theory is a logic
program or a default theory. (For example, [20] does not have such a restriction.) But even
in this case our formulation is useful and nontrivial, as we will use it (in Sections 4.2 and
4.3) to show the filter abducibility of several logic programming and default theory based
formulations [3,43,44,67] of reasoning about actions. In these formulations, each model
corresponds to the evolution of the real state of the world, and the abducibles correspond
to the value of fluents in the initial state of the world. Thus each potential explanation needs
to be a complete interpretation of the abducibles.
Similar to abducibles, we will have a set of ground atoms denoted by Obsa , which we
will call observable atoms. Any formula constructed using atoms in Obsa , and logical
connectives will be referred to as an observable formula. By Obs, we will denote the set of
all observable formulas. We will often refer to Obs as the set of observables, an element of
Obs as an observation, and denote the set of ground literals in Obs as Obsl .
In this simpler form, abduction can now be thought of as a method of reasoning which
given a knowledge base T—whose language contains the atoms in Abda and Obsa—and
an observation Q, finds possible explanations of Q in terms of a complete subset 4 of the
abducibles.
We would now like to formally define explanations and abductive entailment. In this
paper T denotes a possibly nonmonotonic theory. In particular we will be considering
(i) extended and disjunctive logic programs,
(ii) default theories, and
(iii) theories in propositional and first-order logic possibly augmented with circumscrip-
tion.
For each of these theories, we will now list what is meant by a model, what observations
are allowed and how entailment is defined.
– In case of a disjunctive logic program (or an extended logic program), by ‘model’ we
will mean an answer set [27]. When T is a disjunctive logic program, observations
3 Although we use a more general notion of abducibles than [9,32,64], it would be interesting to extend the
results in this paper for the more general case obtained by lifting the restriction that if an atom is abducible then
so is its negation.
4 We say a set S is a complete set with respect to Abd, iff for any atom a in Abda—the set of atoms in Abd
—either a or ¬a is in S . Often, we will just say S is complete.
8 C. Baral / Artificial Intelligence 120 (2000) 1–28
(Q) are allowed to be a (possibly infinite) collection of ground formulas, constructed
using atoms in Obsa , and classical logic connectives. Q may be represented by a set
of formulasQf with variables, where the variables serve as schema variables and are
substituted with ground terms in the language to obtain Q. We say an answer set A
entails a formula F if A entails F in the sense of classical logic. We say a disjunctive
logic program T entails Q—denoted by T  Q—if all answer sets of T entail all
formulas in Q.
Given a set of literals L and a logic program T , by T ∪L we mean the logic program
T ∪ {l← : l ∈ L}.
– In case of a default theory, by ‘model’ we will mean consequences of an extension.
The allowed observations (Q) is as in the previous case. We say an extensionE entails
a formula F if E entails F in the sense of classical logic. We say a default theory T
entails Q—denoted by T Q—if all extensions of T entail all formulas in Q.
– In case of propositional theory (or a first-order theory)—possibly augmented
with circumscription—by ‘model’ we will mean a classical model. The allowed
observations (Q) are formulas in propositional logic (or first-order logic) and
entailment between T and Q is the classical entailment relation.
Given a set of formulas Q and a classical theory T = {T1, . . . , Tn}, where each Ti is
a classical theory (possibly augmented with circumscription) by T ∪Q we will mean
the theory {Q,T1, . . . , Tn}.
Definition 1 (Explanation). Let T be a (possibly nonmonotonic) theory with an entailment
relation , and Q be an observation. A complete set of abducibles E (from Abd) is said to
be an explanation of Q with respect to a theory T if T ∪E Q and T ∪ E is consistent
(i.e., it has a model).
We would now like to define abductive entailment (abd) with respect to a pair 〈T ,Q〉,
which we refer to as an abductive theory.
Definition 2 (Abductive entailment).
(i) M is a model of 〈T ,Q〉 if there exists an explanation E of Q with respect to T such
that M is a model of T ∪E.
(ii) For any formula f , 〈T ,Q〉 abd f if f is true in all models of 〈T ,Q〉.
Note that in this paper by abductive reasoning we refer to reasoning using the abductive
entailment relation abd defined above.
Proposition 1. Abductive theories are monotonic with respect to addition of observations.
Proof. Suppose we have Q1 ⊆Q2. Then any explanation of Q2 with respect to T is an
explanation of Q1 with respect to T . Thus models of 〈T ,Q2〉 are models of 〈T ,Q1〉 and
hence, abd is monotonic with respect to Q. 2
Definition 3. Let T be a (possibly nonmonotonic) theory and Q be an observation. By
Filter(T ,Q), we refer to the set of models of T which entail Q.
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Proposition 2. Entailment with respect to Filter(T ,Q) is monotonic with respect to Q.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of Filter(T ,Q). 2
3. Abductive reasoning through filtering—Main results
The main goal of this paper is to identify conditions on theories, abducibles and
observables such that abductive reasoning can be done through filtering. We now formally
define such triplets.
Definition 4 (Filter-abducible). A theory T , a set Abd, and a set Obs are said to be filter-
abducible if for all possible observations Q ∈ Obs, Filter(T ,Q) is the set of models of
〈T ,Q〉.
Before we define conditions for filter-abducibility, we first show an example where
Filter(T ,Q) is different from the set of models of 〈T ,Q〉, and then show an example
where they are the same.
Example 2. Consider the extended logic program [27] T1:
p← a
p← b
Let Abd= {a, b,¬a,¬b}, and Obsa = {p}.
Let Q = {p}. It is easy to see that the models of 〈T1,Q〉 are {{p,a,¬b}, {p,b,¬a},
{p,a, b}}, while Filter(T1,Q)= ∅.
Now consider T ′1 to be the following extended logic program, where we have added four
new rules to T1.
p← a
p← b
a← not ¬a
¬a← not a
b← not ¬b
¬b← not b
It is easy to see that the set of models of 〈T ′1,Q〉 is {{p,a,¬b}, {p,b,¬a}, {p,a, b}}which
is same as Filter(T ′1,Q).
Note that the set of models of T ′1 ∪Q is {{p,a,¬b}, {p,b,¬a}, {p,a, b}, {p,¬b,¬a}}
and is different from Filter(T ′1,Q).
Now let us compare T1 and T ′1 and analyze the differences. Syntactically, the difference
between them is the last four rules of T ′1. These four rules guarantee that T ′1 has at least one
model corresponding to each potential explanation (i.e., interpretation of the abducibles).
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Since unlike during abductive reasoning, during filtering there is no scope to try each
potential explanation so as not to miss any explanation, the models of the theory should
enumerate the potential explanations. This is missing in T1 and therefore T1 is not filter-
abducible with respect to the above mentioned Abd and Obs. On the other hand, T ′1 satisfies
this criteria and it is filter-abducible with respect to the same Abd and Obs. In the following
paragraphs, we precisely state the above mentioned property as condition B. We now
discuss additional conditions that may be important.
For filtering to be equivalent to abductive reasoning, each one of the models obtained by
filtering a theory T with an observationQ should contain an explanation of the observation.
In that case the abducibles in those models consist of an explanation. For that to happen,
the theory must be such that the abducibles uniquely determine the observables. If we want
to avoid making any restrictions on the observables then the theory must be such that the
abducibles uniquely determine the model. These two conditions are precisely stated below
as Condition A′ and Condition A, respectively.
We now formally state the above mentioned conditions.
Condition A. If M is a model of theory T then M is the unique model of the theory
T ∪ (M ∩ Abd).
Intuitively, Condition A means that the models of a theory T can be characterized by
just the abducible literals in that model. It requires that if M is a model of a theory T then
M should be the only model of the theory T ∪ (M ∩ Abd). This is a strong condition, as
in many cases T ∪ (M ∩Abd) may have multiple models. To take into account such cases,
we can weaken condition A, by the following condition. But we will need to use Obs as
part of our condition.
Condition A′ . If M is a model of theory T then:
(i) M is a model of T ∪ (M ∩ Abd);
(ii) all models of T ∪ (M ∩ Abd) are also models of T ; and
(iii) all models of T ∪ (M ∩ Abd) agree on Obs; where two models M1 and M2 of a
theory are said to agree on Obs if for allQ ∈Obs, we haveM1  Obs iffM2 Obs.
Condition B. For any complete subset E of Abd if T ∪E is consistent then there exists a
model M of T such that M ∩ Abd=E.
Intuitively, Condition B means that the theory T has models corresponding to each
possible interpretation of the abducibles. I.e., the models of the theory T enumerate the
possible explanations.
Lemma 1. Let T be a theory satisfying Conditions A and B. Let E be any complete subset
of Abd. If M is a model of T ∪E, then M ∩ Abd=E.
Proof. Let E be any complete subset of Abd.
From Condition B we have that there exists a model M ′ of T such that M ′ ∩Abd = E.
But from Condition A, we have that M ′ is the unique model of T ∪E.
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Thus if M is a model of T ∪E, then M =M ′ and thus M ∩ Abd=E. 2
Theorem 1. If T , Obs and Abd satisfy Conditions A′ and B then they are filter-abducible;
i.e., they satisfy the following: “for all observations Q ∈ Obs, Filter(T ,Q) is the set of
models of 〈T ,Q〉”.
Proof. (a) We first show that if T , Obs and Abd satisfy Conditions A′ and B then all
elements of Filter(T ,Q) are models of 〈T ,Q〉.
Let M be an element of Filter(T ,Q).
⇒M is a model of T and M entails Q.
From Condition A′ we have T ∪ (M ∩Abd) is consistent and all models of T ∪ (M ∩Abd)
are also models of T and agree on the observables.
Let E =M ∩ Abd.
We then have T ∪E Q and T ∪E is consistent.
⇒ There exists an explanation E of Q with respect to T such that M is a model of
T ∪E.
⇒M is a model of 〈T ,Q〉.
(b) We will now show that if T , Obs and Abd satisfy Conditions A′ and B then all models
of 〈T ,Q〉 are in Filter(T ,Q).
Let M be a model of 〈T ,Q〉.
⇒ There exists an explanation E of Q with respect to T such that M is a model of
T ∪E.
⇒ There exists a complete set of abducibles E such that T ∪ E  Q and T ∪ E is
consistent and M is a model of T ∪E.
From Condition B we have that there exists a model M ′ of T such that M ′ ∩ Abd = E.
But from Condition A′ all models of T ∪E are also models of T and agree on Q.
ThusM is a model of T . Since M is also a model of T ∪E and T ∪E Q, we have M
entails Q.
ThusM ∈ Filter(T ,Q). 2
Lemma 2. If T , Obs and Abd satisfy Condition A then they also satisfies Condition A′.
Proof. Straightforward. 2
Corollary 1. If a theory T , and abducibles Abd satisfy Conditions A and B then for any
set of Obsl in the language of T , the theory T , Abd and Obs are filter-abducible.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2 and Theorem 1. 2
The main significance of the above corollary is that by requiring the more restrictive
Condition A we have more flexibility with the observables.
We now give some examples where we can verify filter-abducibility by verifying the
above mentioned conditions.
Example 3. The propositional theory T2 = p⇔ a ∨ b with Abd = {a, b,¬a,¬b} and
Obsl = {p,¬p} satisfies Conditions A and B.
12 C. Baral / Artificial Intelligence 120 (2000) 1–28
This is because the models of T2 are {{¬a,¬b,¬p}, {¬a, b,p}, {a,¬b,p}, {a, b,p}}
and it is easy to see that for each model M in this set, T2 ∪M has the only modelM .
Example 4. The following logic program T ′2
q ∨ r← a
p← a
p← b
a ∨¬a←
b ∨¬b←
with abducibles {a, b,¬a,¬b} and Obsa = {p} satisfies Conditions A′ and B.
This can be verified as follows. The program T ′2 has six models, which are: {a, b,p, q},{a, b,p, r}, {a,¬b,p, q}, {a,¬b,p, r}, {¬a, b,p}, and {¬a,¬b}. Let us refer to them as
M1, M2, M3, M4, M5 and M6 respectively. Consider the model M1. Let us verify that it
satisfies Condition A′. It is easy to see thatM1 is a model of T ′2∪ (M1∩Abd) = T ′2∪{a, b},
and all models of T ′2 ∪ {a, b} are models of T ′2 and they agree on Obs. We can similarly
verify that the other models of T ′2 satisfy the conditions of A′. (Note that if we include q
or r in Obsa , Condition A′ will no longer be satisfied.)
In this example there are four complete subsets of Abd. These are: {a, b}, {a,¬b}, {¬a,
b}, {¬a,¬b}. Consider E = {a, b}. Since T ′2 ∪E is consistent, we need to verify that there
exists a modelM of T ′2 such thatM∩Abd =E.M1 is such a model of T ′2. We can similarly
verify that the other complete subsets of Abd satisfy Condition B.
4. Filter-abducibility in monotonic and nonmonotonic theories
Depending on whether a theory is in a monotonic or a nonmonotonic language filtering
can be achieved in different ways. We now list how filtering can be achieved in several
different knowledge representation formalisms.
– If T is in a monotonic language, to filter T by Q we just add Q to T . Otherwise, i.e.,
if T is in a nonmonotonic language, to filter T by Q we cannot just add Q to T . This
is because, as stated in Proposition 2, filtering has the monotonicity property.
– If T is a logic program, to filter T by Q we can view Q as an integrity constraint.
(Often integrity constraints are expressed through rules with empty head or with false
in its head. They can also be expressed using rules of the form p← c,not p, where
p is a new atom, and c is the constraint.) Such a view is used in [3,67] to assimilate
observations to action theories expressed in a logic program. In [41] an algorithm is
given to translate general formulas to the restricted syntax of integrity constraints in
logic programs.
– If T is a default theory, to filter T by Q we can express Q as a default rule with an
empty consequent or false as its consequent. Such a view is used in [67] to assimilate
observations to action theories expressed in a logic program.
– If T is a nested abnormality theory (NAT) then we can filter T with respect to Q
by the NAT consisting of two blocks; one of which is T and the other is Q. As a
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nonmonotonic knowledge representation formalism NAT has the advantage that it
makes it easy to have multiple levels of filtering.
Our goal in this section is to develop and describe specific sufficiency conditions that
can be used to show filter-abducibility in particular knowledge representation formalisms.
The ones we consider are: circumscriptive theories; first-order theories; disjunctive logic
programming; and Reiter’s default logic. But first we define the notion of a theory encoding
a function, which will play an important role when we define the specific sufficiency
conditions for each of the knowledge representation formalism that we will be considering.
Definition 5. A theory T is said to encode a function (or is functional) from a set of literals,
called input, to a set of literals called output if for any complete subset E of input such that
T ∪E is consistent, all models of T ∪E agree on the literals from output.
4.1. Filter-abducibility of first-order and circumscriptive theories
The following proposition states conditions for the filter-abducibility of propositional
and first-order theories.
Proposition 3. A propositional or first-order theory (possibly augmented with circum-
scription) T is filter-abducible with respect to abducibles Abd and observables Obs if T is
functional from Abd to Obsl . 5
Proof. The proof is based on showing that the if part of the proposition implies
Conditions A′ (i)–(iii) and B. Earlier in Theorem 1 we proved that Conditions A′ and
B guarantee filter-abducibility.
It is easy to see that, because of monotonicity of the theory T , Conditions A′(i) and
A′(ii) are true. Condition A′(iii) is true due to the condition that T is functional from Abd
to Obs. We now only need to show that Condition B holds. Let E be a complete subset of
Abd such that T ∪E is consistent. Let M be a model of T ∪E. Obviously, E ⊆M . Since
E is a complete subset of Abd we have that M ∩ Abd =E. Thus Condition B holds. 2
We now discuss two examples whose filter-abducibility can be deduced using Proposi-
tion 3.
Example 5. Consider the following theory T3:
r(p)← q(a)
r(p)← q(b)
and let Obsa = {r(p)} and Abd = {q(a), q(b),¬q(a),¬q(b)}.
The theory T3 with Obs and Abd is not filter-abducible. Suppose our observation is r(p).
Then the models of T3 are {q(a), q(b), r(p)}, {¬q(a), q(b), r(p)}, {q(a),¬q(b), r(p)},
{¬q(a),¬q(b), r(p)}, and {¬q(a),¬q(b),¬r(p)}.
5 We use Obsl instead of Obs because functional is defined between sets of literals.
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It is easy to see that the elements of Filter(T3, {r(p)}) are {q(a), q(b), r(p)}, {¬q(a),
q(b), r(p)}, {q(a),¬q(b), r(p)}, and {¬q(a),¬q(b), r(p)}, while the models of 〈T3,
{r(p)}〉 are {q(a), q(b), r(p)}, {¬q(a), q(b), r(p)}, and {q(a),¬q(b), r(p)}. Thus, T3,
Obs and Abd are not filter-abducible.
Since T3 is a first-order theory, using Proposition 3 we can conclude that T3 does
not encode a function from Abd to Obs. Indeed we can verify this by considering the
input E = {¬q(a),¬q(b)}. The theory T3 ∪E has two models {r(p),¬q(a),¬q(b)} and
{¬r(p),¬q(a),¬q(b)} with different values of the observable r(p), and hence is not
functional from Abd to Obs.
Let us now consider T1 = CIRC(T3; r; ∅), then Filter(T1, {r(p)}), and the set of models
of 〈T1, {r(p)}〉 are the same. What happens is that by minimizing r in T1, the resulting
theory is equivalent to T2 = (r(p)⇔ q(a)∨ q(b)), which is functional from Abd to Obs.
In the above example, T2 is obtained by doing completion [8] of T1 with respect to
the predicate r . In [9], Console et al. describe more general results where they transform
hierarchical propositional and first-order theories so that abductive reasoning with respect
to the original theory is achieved by simply adding the observation—which in this case is
same as filtering—to the transformed theory. We further discuss this in the next subsection.
4.1.1. Knowledge assimilation through completion
A hierarchical propositional theory is a collection of clauses of the form
L1 ∧ · · · ∧Ln→ p,
where each Li is a literal and p is an atom, and where each atom in the theory is assigned
a level ( a natural number) such that in a clause of the above form, the level of p is greater
than the level of Li , for any 16 i 6 n. The set Abda of abducible atoms is the set of atoms
that do not appear in the right hand side of any of the clauses.
Consider such a theory T with p1, . . . , pn as all the non-abducible atoms in it. The
transformation Tc is the set of equivalences {pi↔Qi1 ∨ · · · ∨Qim: i = 1, . . . , n}, where
{Qij → pi, j = 1, . . . ,m} are the set of clauses in T having pi in their right hand side.
Console et al. [9] show that abductive reasoning with respect to a hierarchical
propositional theory T is equivalent to deduction with respect to the transformed theory
Tc. They then generalize their result to the first-order case. The sort of completion used
by Console et al. was first used by Poole in a more limited setting in [54]. Similar results
were also independently developed by Konolige in [36]. Such results are referred to as
‘abduction through deduction’ in the literature [32,62,64] and Poole [54,55] was perhaps
the first one to pursue research along these lines in a non-probabilistic setting.
Coming back to Tc, let us assume that, as in [9], observables are consistent conjunction
of literals with no occurrence of abducible atoms. It is easy to see that Tc is functional from
abducibles to observable literals. Thus using Proposition 3 we can conclude that Tc is filter-
abducible with respect to the above mentioned abducibles and observables. Proposition 3
thus supports the result of Console et al. But it also has several additional implications:
– For example, Proposition 3 also explains the restrictions posed on the clauses.
If we were to allow disjunctions in the right hand side of the clauses, and/or not require
the clauses to be hierarchical, we can no longer guarantee that Tc will be functional
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from abducibles to observable literals. As a result we will not have a guarantee that
Tc will be filter-abducible.
For example, let T be p→ a ∨ b. Then Tc will be p↔ a ∨ b. Suppose we observe
a, then using deduction with respect to Tc we will conclude p as an explanation. But
p is not an explanation of a with respect to T . The fact that Tc is not functional from
{p,¬p} to {a, b,¬a,¬b}, warns us to not expect Tc to be filter-abducible with respect
to them.
– Proposition 3 also suggests ways to extend the results of Console et al.
If we can find a larger class of T , abducibles, or observables such that Tc will be
functional from abducibles to observable literals then we will have a more general
result.
A simple generalization is the case, where we allow observables to include the
abducibles. Since Tc remains functional from abducibles to (the expanded) observable
literals the filter-abducibility result still holds.
We will now give an example from the domain of reasoning about actions, where we
have filter-abducibility.
4.1.2. Filter-abducibility of action theories
Let us consider a subset of the action description language A [28] where domain
descriptions may have two kinds of propositions: initial value propositions and effect
propositions. We will refer to this language as A0. (The alphabet of A0 consists of three
disjoint nonempty sets of symbols called fluents, actions, and situations. We will also
assume that S0 is one of the situations in the language of A0 and by a fluent literal we
will mean a fluent possibly preceded by ¬.)
An initial value proposition is a proposition of the form
initially F
where F is a fluent literal.
An effect proposition is a proposition of the form
A causes F if P1, . . . ,Pn
where F,P1, . . . ,Pn are fluent literals and A is an action. We refer to {P1, . . . ,Pn} as the
precondition of the above effect proposition.
We will be restricting domain descriptions to collections of effect propositions and initial
value propositions such that for any two effect propositions that describe the effect of
the same action a on complementary f ’s, and have P1, . . . ,Pn and Q1, . . . ,Qm as their
preconditions we have that {P1, . . . ,Pn} ∩ {Q1, . . . ,Qm} 6= ∅. (This will guarantee that an
action does not cause a fluent and its complement in the same situation.)
Following is a translation of domain descriptions in this language to a many-sorted
nested abnormality theory [37] in situation calculus notation. (The sorts in the theory are:
actions, fluents, and situations. The variables for the three sorts will be denoted by possibly
indexed letters a, f and s, respectively, unless otherwise stated. The language includes
the actions and fluents in A as action constants, and fluent constants, and S0 as one of
the situation constants. In addition, the theory has the predicate constants: Causes—with
arguments of sort actions, fluents and situations, Holds—with arguments of sort fluents
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and situations, and Initially—with arguments of sort fluents, and the function constant Res
from actions and situations to situations. The theory also has the standard Unique Name
Axioms (UNA) 6 and Domain Closure Axioms (DCA) 7 (say as in [35,37]). In the theory,
we use the notationH as a short hand, where for a fluent F , H(F,S) denotes Holds(F,S)
and H(¬F,S) denotes ¬Holds(F,S).)
SCc(Dl)=
UNA[actions],UNA[fluents],UNA[situations]
DCA[actions],DCA[fluents],DCA[situations]
(1) ¬Causes+(a, f, s)∧¬Causes−(a, f, s)
⊃ [Holds(f, s)≡Holds(f,Res(a, s))]
(2) Causes+(a, f, s)⊃Holds(f,Res(a, s))
(3) Causes−(a, f, s)⊃¬Holds(f,Res(a, s))
(4) Initially(f )≡Holds(f,S0)
(5) Initially(F ) (for each initially F ∈D)
(6) ¬Initially(F ) (for each initially ¬F ∈D)
{min Causes+(−) :
(7) H(P1, s)∧ · · · ∧H(Pn, s)⊃ Causes+(−)(A,F, s)
(for each A causes (¬)F if P1, . . . ,Pn ∈D)
}
In the above theory let us have Abda as the set of atoms using Initially and Obsa as the set
of atoms using Holds. By showing that the above theory is functional from abducibles to
observable literals, we can use Proposition 3 8 to conclude that assimilation of observations
with respect to the above theory can be done by simply adding the observation to the theory.
Let us now briefly argue why the above theory is functional from abducibles to
observable literals. From axiom (4) it is clear that given a complete set of ‘Initially’ literals,
we have a unique (and complete) set of Holds literals at the situation s0, in all models of
the theory. We will now argue that given a complete set of Holds literals at the situation
s, for any action A, there is a unique (and complete) set of Holds literals at the situation
Res(A, s), in all models of the theory. (A detailed proof of this is given in [4].)
The NAT block defining Causes+(−) guarantees that given a complete set of Holds
literals at a situation s, we have a unique (and complete) set of Causes+(−) literals at
the situation s, with respect to any action A, and any fluent F . Because of our restrictions
on domain descriptions, we will never have Causes+(a, f, s) and Causes−(a, f, s, ) to be
true in the same model. This fact together with the axioms (1)–(3) guarantee that given a
complete set of Holds literals at any situation s, and for any action A, there is a unique
(and complete) set of Holds literals at the situation Res(A, s) in all models of the theory.
6 If A1, . . . ,An are the only actions in the language, then UNA[actions] stands for A1 6=A2,A2 6=A3, etc.
7 If A1, . . . ,An are the only actions in the language, then DCA[actions] stands for (∀a).a =A1 ∨· · · ∨a =An .
8 Actually we need to extend Proposition 3 so as to be applicable to nested abnormality theories. This extension
is straightforward.
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Thus SCc is functional from its abducibles to its observable literals and hence it is filter-
abducible.
4.2. Filter-abducibility of disjunctive logic programs
In this subsection we will discuss the filter-abducibility of disjunctive logic programs.
In particular, we will give some sufficiency conditions that guarantee that Conditions A′
and B holds. But first, for the sake of completeness, we will give the definitions and results
related to the notion of splitting [39] which will be used in the sufficiency conditions.
A disjunctive logic program (DLP) is a collection of rules of the form
l1 ∨ · · · ∨ lk← lk+1, . . . , lm, not lm+1, . . . , not ln (1)
where k > 0, and each li is a literal, i.e., an atom possibly preceded by ¬, and not is
the negation as failure operator. Expression on the left hand (right hand) side of ← is
called the head (the body) of the rule. Both, the head and the body of (1) can be empty.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that rules with variables are used as shorthand for
the set consisting of all their ground instantiations. Intuitively the rule can be read as: if
lk+1, . . . , lm are believed and it is not true that lm+1, . . . , ln are believed then at least one
of {l1, . . . , lk} is believed. For a rule r of the form (1) the sets {l1, . . . , lk}, {lk+1, . . . , lm}
and {lm+1, . . . , ln} are referred to as head(r), pos(r) and neg(r) respectively. lit(r) stands
for head(r) ∪ pos(r) ∪ neg(r). For any DLP Π , head(Π) =⋃r∈Π head(r). For a set of
predicates S, Lit(S) denotes the set of literals with predicates from S. For a DLPΠ , Lit(Π)
denotes the set of literals with predicates from the language of Π . When it is clear from
the context we write Lit instead of Lit(Π).
Definition 6 (Splitting set [39]). A splitting set for a program Π is any set U of literals
such that, for every rule r ∈Π , if head(r) ∩U 6= ∅ then lit(r)⊂ U . If U is a splitting set
for Π , we also say that U splits Π . The set of rules r ∈Π such that lit(r) ⊂ U is called
the bottom of Π relative to the splitting set U and denoted by botU(Π). The subprogram
Π \ botU(Π) is called the top of Π relative to U .
Definition 7 (Partial evaluation [39]). The partial evaluation of a programΠ with splitting
set U with respect to a set of literals X is the program eU (Π,X) defined as follows. For
each rule r ∈Π such that
(pos(r)∩U)⊂X and (neg(r)∩U) ∩X = ∅,
eU (Π,X) consists of all the rules r ′ that satisfy the following property:
head(r ′)= head(r), pos(r ′)= pos(r) \U, neg(r ′)= neg(r) \U.
Definition 8 (Solution [39]). Let U be a splitting set for a program Π . A solution to Π
with respect to U is a pair 〈X,Y 〉 of literals such that:
– X is an answer set for botU(Π);
– Y is an answer set for eU (Π \ botU(Π),X);
– X ∪ Y is consistent.
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Lemma 3 (Splitting lemma [39]). Let U be a splitting set for a program Π . A set A of
literals is a consistent answer set for Π if and only if A=X ∪ Y for some solution 〈X,Y 〉
to Π with respect to U .
We are now ready to give sufficiency conditions that guarantee filter-abducibility for
disjunctive logic programs.
Proposition 4. An extended logic program T is filter-abducible with respect to abducibles
Abd and observables Obs if
(i) T is functional from Abd to Obsl ,
(ii) for all l,¬l ∈ Abd, l ∨¬l← is in T , and
(iii) Abd is a splitting set for T .
Proof. We prove this by showing that conditions (i)–(ii) above imply Conditions A′ and B
which in turn guarantee filter-abducibility of a theory.
(a) Showing Condition A′(i).
We now show that conditions (i)–(ii) implies Condition A′(i).
When T is inconsistent this result trivially holds. Let us consider the case when T is
consistent.
Let M be a consistent answer set of T .
⇒M is a minimal answer set of TM .
⇒M is a minimal answer set of TM ∪ (M ∩ Abd).
⇒M is a minimal answer set of (T ∪ (M ∩ Abd))M .
⇒M is an answer set of T ∪ (M ∩ Abd).
⇒ Condition A′(i) holds.
(b) Showing Condition A′(ii).
Let M be an answer set of T . It is clear that M ∩ Abd is a complete set of abducible
literals and is an answer set of botAbd(T ). Thus by Lemma 3, all answer set of T ∪ (M ∩
Abd) are answer sets of T . Thus Condition A′(ii) holds.
(c) Showing Condition A′(iii).
Since T is functional from Abd to Obs and M ∩ Abd is a complete set of abducible
literals, it is clear that Condition A′(iii) holds.
(d) Showing Condition B.
Let E be any arbitrary complete subset of Abd. From condition (ii) of the proposition,
E is an answer set of botAbd(T ). Hence by Lemma 3, there exists an answer set M of T ,
such that M ∩ Abd= E. Thus Condition B is satisfied. 2
Let us again consider the domain description in the previous section and show how it
can be formalized into a filter-abducible disjunctive logic program. Here we use the logic
programming notation, with variables in capital letters, and constants in small letters.
1. Inertia axioms:
(1a) holds(F,Res(A,S))← holds(F,S), not ab(A,F ,S)
(1b) ¬holds(F,Res(A,S))←¬holds(F,S), not ab(A,F,S)
}
(1a)−(1b).
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2. Translating e-propositions:
The translation of an e-proposition “a causes f if p1, . . . , pn” consists of
(2a) h(f, res(a, S))← h(p1, S), . . . , h(pn,S)
(2b) ab(a, f,S)← h(p1, S), . . . , h(pn,S)
}
where for a fluent g, h(g, s) denotes the literal holds(g, s) and h(¬g, s) denotes the literal
¬holds(g, s).
The effect axiom allows us to prove that f will hold after a, if the preconditions are
satisfied.
3. Initial value proposition. An initial proposition “initially f ” is translated as
(3) h(f, s0)← .
4. Full awareness about the initial situation rule
(4) holds(F, s0)∨¬holds(F, s0)← .
For a given domain description D, the filter-abducibility of a program generated by the
steps 1–4 can be easily verified by showing that the program satisfies the conditions of
Proposition 4 when abducibles are literals about holds in the situation s0 and observable
literals are literals about holds in any situation. (The detailed analysis of an extension of
this program is given in [3].)
To assimilate observations of the form “f after a1, . . . , am” we need to filter the above
logic program. In logic programming filtering can be done using integrity constraints
(or through clauses with empty heads). Thus in this case assimilation is done by adding
integrity constraints of the form below to the logic program.
(5) ← not h(f, [a1, . . . , am]),
where [a1, . . . , am] stands for the ground term Res(am,Res(am−1, . . . ,Res(a1, s0) . . .)).
4.3. Filter-abducibility of default theories
Sufficiency conditions for the filter-abducibility of Reiter’s default theory is very similar
to the sufficiency conditions for disjunctive logic programs that we gave in the last
subsection.
Proposition 5. A default theory T is filter-abducible with respect to abducibles Abd and
observables Obs if
(i) T is functional from Abd to Obsl ,
(ii) { :l
l
, :¬l¬l : l ∈ Abd} is a subset of T , and(iii) Abd is a splitting set [66] for T .
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 4. 2
The logic program in the previous section can be written as a default theory satisfying
the conditions in Proposition 5. The main trick is to write the ‘full awareness about the
initial situation rule’ as defaults of the following form:
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: holds(F, s0)
holds(F, s0)
: ¬holds(F, s0)
¬holds(F, s0) .
Turner in [67] uses such defaults.
Observations of the form “f after a1, . . . , am” can then be assimilated by adding
¬holds(f, [a1, . . . , am])
false
to the corresponding default theory. Such defaults with false in their conclusion satisfy the
role of filtering in default theories.
5. Are Conditions A′ and B necessary?
In Section 3 we show that Conditions A′ and B are sufficient for filter-abducibility. In
this section we show that they are also necessary.
Theorem 2. Let T be a theory, and Obs and Abd be observables and abducibles such that,
for allQ ∈Obs, Filter(T ,Q) is equivalent to the set of models of 〈T ,Q〉. Then T , Obs and
Abd satisfy Conditions B , A′(i),A′(ii) and A′(iii).
Proof. (i) Suppose T , Obs and Abd do not satisfy Condition B. That means there exists an
E ⊆ Abd, such that T ∪E is consistent, but there does not exist a modelM of T such that
M ∩ Abd=E.
Since T ∪E is consistent it has at least one model. LetM∗ be a model of T ∪E. Let Q
be the conjunction of the literals in M∗ ∩Obsl . ObviouslyM∗ is a model of 〈T ,Q〉. Since
M∗ is a model of T ∪E,M∗ ∩Abd=E. But then from our initial assumption,M∗ can not
be a model of T . Hence M∗ is not in Filter(T ,Q). This contradicts the assumption in the
lemma that Filter(T ,Q) is equivalent to the set of models of 〈T ,Q〉. Hence T must satisfy
Condition B.
(ii) Suppose T , Obs and Abd do not satisfy Condition A′(i). That means there is a model
M of T which is not a model of T ∪ (M ∩ Abd). Let Q =M ∩ Abd. Obviously M is in
Filter(T ,Q). We will now show that M is not a model of 〈T ,Q〉. Suppose M is a model
of 〈T ,Q〉. That means there is an E ⊆ Abd, such that M is a model of T ∪E and M Q.
But then M ∩ Abd = E, and this contradicts our initial assumption that M is not a model
of T ∪ (M ∩Abd). Hence M is not a model of 〈T ,Q〉. But this contradicts the assumption
in the lemma that Filter(T ,Q) is equivalent to the set of models of 〈T ,Q〉. Hence T must
satisfy Condition A′(i).
(iii) Suppose T , Obs and Abd do not satisfy Condition A′(ii). That means there is
a model M of T such that all models of T ∪ (M ∩ Abd) are not models of T . Let
Q=M ∩Abd. LetM ′ be a model of T ∪ (M ∩Abd) which is not a model of T . Obviously,
M ′ is a model of 〈T ,Q〉. But it is not an element of Filter(T ,Q). This contradicts the
assumption in the lemma that Filter(T ,Q) is equivalent to the set of models of 〈T ,Q〉.
Hence T must satisfy Condition A′(ii).
(iv) Suppose T , Obs and Abd do not satisfy Condition A′(iii). That means there is a
modelM of T such that all models of T ∪ (M ∩Abd) do not agree on the observables. This
means Obsl \Abd 6= ∅. LetQ= (M ∩Obsl )∪ (M ∩Abd). ObviouslyM is in Filter(T ,Q).
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We will now show that M is not a model of 〈T ,Q〉. Suppose M is a model of 〈T ,Q〉.
That means there is a complete subset E of Abd, such that M is a model of T ∪ E and
T ∪ E  Q. Since E is a complete subset of Abd, E = M ∩ Abd. Since all models of
T ∪ (M ∩ Abd) do not agree on observables T ∪E 2Q. This contradicts our assumption
and henceM is not a model of 〈T ,Q〉. But then, we have a contradiction to the assumption
in the lemma that Filter(T ,Q) is equivalent to the set of models of 〈T ,Q〉. Hence T must
satisfy Condition A′(iii). 2
We would like to mention that the known ways to satisfy Condition B in default theories
and logic programs are to have rules of the form l ∨ ¬l (or have two rules of the form
l← not ¬l;¬l← not l) for all abducible atoms l in logic programs and defaults of
of the form :l
l
and :¬l¬l for all abducible atoms l in default theories. (The former was first
used in [31] to relate semantics of abductive logic programs—based on the generalized
stable models [33], and extended logic programs. The later was used in [42,67].) Hence
the necessity of Condition B for filter-abducibility makes it necessary (to the best of our
knowledge) to have such rules and defaults in filter-abducible logic programs and default
theories, respectively.
6. Preferential abductive reasoning and filtering
So far we have considered simple abductive reasoning and filtering. But often (as in [59])
both abductive reasoning and filtering is accompanied by some preference criteria. In
this section we extend the definition of abductive entailment to preferential abductive
entailment and also extend the definition of filtering to preferential filtering. We then give
conditions (sufficiency) when they are equivalent. We now define preferential abductive
entailment and preferential filtering.
Definition 9 (Preferential abductive entailment). Suppose we have a partial ordering 6e
that encodes preferences between explanations. We say:
M is a model of 〈T ,Q,6e〉 if there exists an 6e-minimal explanation E of Q with
respect to T such that M is a model of T ∪E.
〈T ,Q,6e〉 abd f if f is true in all models of 〈T ,Q,6e〉.
Definition 10. Suppose we have a partial ordering 6m that encodes preferences between
models.
Filter(T ,Q,6m) = The 6m-minimal models among the models of T that entail Q.
For the equivalence of preferential abductive entailment and preferential filtering we
need two additional conditions that relate the partial ordering 6e between explanations
and 6m between models.
Condition C. If E 6e E′ then for any model M of T ∪ E and any model M ′ of T ∪ E′
we have M 6m M ′.
Condition D. If M 6m M ′ then M ∩ Abd6e M ′ ∩ Abd.
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Definition 11 (Preferential filter-abducible). A theory T , observables Obs and abducibles
Abd are said to be preferential filter-abducible with respect to orderings6e and6m if for all
possible observationsQ; Filter(T ,Q,6m) is equivalent to the set of models of 〈T ,Q,6e〉.
Proposition 6. If T , Obs, Abd,6e and6m satisfy Conditions A, B, C, and D then they are
preferential filter-abducible.
Proof. (a) We show that all elements of Filter(T ,Q,6m) are models of 〈T ,Q,6e〉.
Let M be an element of Filter(T ,Q,6m). That means M is in Filter(T ,Q) and there
does not exist an M ′ in Filter(T ,Q) such that M ′ 6m M . (∗)
Since M is in Filter(T ,Q) it is clear that M is a model of 〈T ,Q〉.
⇒ There exists E such that T ∪E Q, T ∪E is consistent andM is a model of T ∪E.
We now need to show that there does not exist E′ different fromE such that T ∪E′ Q,
T ∪E′ is consistent, and E′ 6e E.
Suppose such an E′ exist.
Let M ′ be a model of T ∪E′.
⇒M ′ is a model of 〈T ,Q〉.
⇒M ′ ∈ Filter(T ,Q).
From Condition C and the fact that M and M ′ are models of T ∪ E and T ∪ E′
respectively and E′ 6e E, we have M ′ 6m M . This contradicts (∗).
Hence we have shown that there does not exist E′ different fromE such that T ∪E′ Q,
T ∪E′ is consistent, and E′ 6e E. Hence M is a model of 〈T ,Q,6e〉.
(b) We will now show that all models of 〈T ,Q,6e〉 are also elements of Filter(T ,Q,
6m).
Let M be a model of 〈T ,Q,6e〉. That means there exists an E such that T ∪ E Q,
T ∪ E is consistent, M is a model of T ∪ E and there does not exist an E′ such that
T ∪E′ Q, T ∪E′ is consistent and E′ 6e E.
It is clear that M is a model of 〈T ,Q〉, and hence is in Filter(T ,Q). We only need to
show that there does not exist an M ′ such that M ′ is in Filter(T ,Q) and M ′ 6m M .
Let us assume to the contrary. I.e., there exists anM ′ such thatM ′ is in Filter(T ,Q) and
M ′ 6m M .
By Condition D, we have M ′ ∩ Abd 6e M ∩ Abd.
Since M is a model of T ∪E, from Lemma 1 we have M ∩ Abd =E.
Now consider the fact that we have assumedM ′ to be in Filter(T ,Q). This meansM ′ is
a model of 〈T ,Q〉. This means there exists an E∗ such that M ′ is a model of T ∪E∗. But
then using Lemma 1 we have M ′ ∩ Abd=E∗.
Now we have E∗ 6e E.
This contradicts our initial assumption that there does not exist an E′ such that T ∪E′ 
Q, T ∪E′ is consistent and E′ 6e E.
Hence we can conclude that there does not exist an M ′ such that M ′ is in Filter(T ,Q)
and M ′ 6m M . Therefore,M is in Filter(T ,Q,6m). 2
Example 6. Let us reconsider Example 3, where T2 = p ⇔ a ∨ b with Abd =
{a, b,¬a,¬b} and Obs= {p,¬p}. We showed that T2, Abd and Obs satisfy Conditions A
and B.
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Let us now define 6e as E1 6e E2 if atoms(E1)⊆ atoms(E2). The intuition behind the
definition of 6e is that we prefer explanations where less (based on the subset ordering)
abducible atoms are true. The notion of minimal explanations commonly uses this ordering.
Now one simple ordering6m between models that will satisfy Conditions C and D is as
follows:
M1 6m M2 if atoms(M1)∩Abd ⊆ atoms(M2)∩Abd. (Here, we are saying that we prefer
models with less abducibles.)
It is easy to see that T2, Obs, Abd, 6e, and 6m satisfy Conditions A, B, C and D. Thus
they are preferential filter-abducible. Let us now verify this with respect to a particular
observationQ= {p}.
The models of 〈T2,Q〉 are {{p,a,¬b}, {p,b,¬a}, {p,a, b}}which is same as Filter(T2,
Q). Now using 6m and 6e we obtain that the models of 〈T2,Q,6m〉 are {{p,a,
¬b}, {p,b,¬a}} which is same as Filter(T2,Q,6e).
As mentioned earlier Condition A requires that if M is a model of a theory T then M
should be the only model of the theory T ∪ (M ∩ Abd). This is a strong condition, as in
many cases T ∪ (M ∩ Abd) may have multiple models. To take into account such cases,
we weakened Condition A to A′. But with preferential filtering and preferential abductive
reasoning we also need to weaken Condition D.
Condition D′. If M 6m M ′ then for any E, and E′ such that M is a model of T ∪E and
M ′ is a model of T ∪E′, E 6e E′.
Lemma 4. If T , Obs, Abd,6e and6m satisfy Conditions A, B, and D then they also satisfy
ConditionD′.
Proposition 7. If T , Obs, Abd, 6e and 6m satisfy Conditions A′, B, C, and D′ then they
are preferential filter-abducible.
Proof. (a) We show that all elements of Filter(T ,Q,6m) are models of 〈T ,Q,6e〉.
The proof is exactly the same as the proof of the Proposition 6.
(b) We will now show that all models of 〈T ,Q,6e〉 are in Filter(T ,Q,6m).
Let M be a model of 〈T ,Q,6e〉. That means there exists an E such that T ∪ E Q,
T ∪ E is consistent, M is a model of T ∪ E and there does not exist an E′ such that
T ∪E′ Q, T ∪E′ is consistent and E′ 6e E.
It is clear that M is a model of 〈T ,Q〉, and hence is in Filter(T ,Q). We only need to
show that there does not exist an M ′ such that M ′ is in Filter(T ,Q) and M ′ 6m M .
Let us assume to the contrary. I.e., there exists anM ′ such thatM ′ is in Filter(T ,Q) and
M ′ 6m M .
Now consider the fact that we have assumedM ′ to be in Filter(T ,Q). This meansM ′ is
a model of 〈T ,Q〉. This means there exists an E∗ such that M ′ is a model of T ∪E∗.
Since M is a model of T ∪E, M ′ is a model of T ∪E∗ and M ′ 6m M , using Condition
D′ we have E∗ 6e E.
This contradicts our initial assumption that there does not exist an E′ such that T ∪E′ 
Q, T ∪E′ is consistent and E′ 6e E.
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Hence we can conclude that there does not exist an M ′ such that M ′ is in Filter(T ,Q)
and M ′ 6m M . Therefore,M is in Filter(T ,Q,6m). 2
7. Weak abductive reasoning versus filtering
Several instances of filtering used in the literature that define an intuitively meaningful
entailment relation do not satisfy the conditions described earlier in this paper. In particular,
when actions have non-deterministic effects (as in [67]) filtering may still make intuitive
sense, but our current definition of abductive reasoning is too strong to match the
entailment defined through filtering. The following example illustrates our point.
Consider the disjunctive logic program: T
a ∨ b← p
p ∨¬p
where Abd= {p,¬p}, and Obsa = {a, b}. Suppose we observe a. Using filtering we would
be able to conclude—in this case intuitively explain our observation by—p. (I.e., p will
be true all models of Filter(T , {a}).) But the current definition of abductive reasoning is
too strong to explain this observation by p. (Note that the above theory will violate our
Condition A′(iii).) This rigidity of abductive reasoning has been noticed earlier and several
suggestions for weaker versions have been made; for example in [26,58,64]. In this section
we define a weaker notion of abductive reasoning and show that it is equivalent to filtering
under less restrictive conditions than given in the earlier sections; in particular, we no
longer need Condition A′(iii). As a result we can also weaken the sufficiency conditions in
Propositions 3–5. We now formally define weak abductive entailment and state theorems
and propositions similar to the ones in the previous sections. (The proofs of these theorems
and propositions are very similar to the earlier proofs and for brevity we omit them.)
Definition 12 (Weak abductive entailment). Let T be a (possibly nonmonotonic) theory
with an entailment relation , and Q be an observation.
(i) M is a w-model (or weak model) of 〈T ,Q〉 if there exists a complete subset E of
abducibles such that M is a model of T ∪E and M Q.
(ii) For any formula f , 〈T ,Q〉 wabd f if f is true in all w-models of 〈T ,Q〉.
Definition 13 (Weak filter-abducible). A theory T , a set Abd, and a set Obs are said to be
weak filter-abducible if for all possible observations Q ∈ Obs; Filter(T ,Q) is the set of
w-models of 〈T ,Q〉.
Theorem 3 (Sufficiency). Let T be a theory, and Obs and Abd be observables. If T , Obs
and Abd satisfy Conditions A′(i), A′(ii) and B then they are weak filter-abducible.
Theorem 4 (Necessity). Let T be a theory, and Obs and Abd be observables and
abducibles such that, for all Q ∈Obs, Filter(T ,Q) is equivalent to the set of weak models
of 〈T ,Q〉. Then T , Obs and Abd satisfy Conditions B , A′(i), and A′(ii).
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Proposition 8. A propositional or first-order theory (possibly augmented with circum-
scription) T is weak filter-abducible with respect to any abducibles Abd and observables
Obs.
Proposition 9. An extended logic program T is weak filter-abducible with respect to
abducibles Abd and observables Obs if
(i) for all l,¬l ∈ Abd, l ∨¬l← is in T , and
(ii) Abd is a splitting set for T .
Proposition 10. A default theory T is weak filter-abducible with respect to abducibles Abd
and observables Obs if
(i) { :l
l
, :¬l¬l : l ∈ Abd} is a subset of T , and
(ii) Abd is a splitting set [66] for T .
8. Conclusion and future work
In this paper we gave conditions on theories that guarantee the equivalence of particular
kinds of abductive reasoning and filtering for assimilation of observations into theories. We
also showed why these conditions are necessary. We gave some sufficiency conditions on
theories expressed in several knowledge representation formalisms so as to guarantee the
equivalence of filtering and abductive reasoning in those formalisms. Finally, we illustrated
several examples from the knowledge representation literature where the theories that use
filtering indeed satisfy the sufficiency conditions and thus can be shown to be encoding
abductive reasoning.
One direction of future work is to explore more syntactic and easily verifiable sufficiency
conditions for particular knowledge representation formalisms. It will be also interesting
to examine additional formalizations in the literature where filtering is used and examine
if indeed some form of abductive reasoning is encoded there.
Another important direction of future work would be to broaden the results in this paper,
where we remove some of the restrictions imposed on the notion of abductive reasoning.
(Note that the restrictions imposed are important in their own right as they lead us to show
the relation between abductive reasoning and filtering in several formulations of reasoning
about actions in the literature.) In particular, when the theory is a disjunctive logic program
or a default theory, it would be interesting to broaden the notion of explanations, to allow
incomplete subset of the abducibles. Such a notion of abductive reasoning in default
theories is defined in [20].
To do abductive reasoning using filtering in this case, the theory should be again such
that its models enumerate the various possible explanations. Suppose Abd= {p,¬p}. Now
that we intend to allow explanations to be incomplete subset of the abducibles, the set
of possible explanations will {{p}, {¬p}, {}}. Since stable models are minimal sets, there
does not exist a logic program whose models will be these three possible explanations.
The minimality condition will eliminate the first two, in presence of the third. One way
to overcome this would be to use a special fluent u_p (meaning uncommitted about p) to
26 C. Baral / Artificial Intelligence 120 (2000) 1–28
represent the third explanation. Then we can have disjunctive logic programming rules of
the form:
p ∨¬p ∨ u_p←
or defaults of the form:
: p,¬u_p
p
; : ¬p,¬u_p¬p ;
: p,¬p
u_p
.
In the sequel we plan to verify if indeed filtering using the above rules and/or defaults lead
us to achieving a more general notion of abductive reasoning.
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